Wyndham Lewis's Vorticist Metaphysic by Foshay, Toby Avard
Wyndham Lewis's Vorticist Metaphysic 
T O B Y A V A R D F O S H A Y 
F 
A Jnemy of the Stars is Wyndham Lewis's first full-length literary 
work. 1 It first appeared in 1914 in the Vorticist journal Blast as 
perhaps the most enigmatic in a collection of intentionally po-
lemical and explosive position pieces. Lewis later revised and 
published it in book form in 1932. In 1914, the original version 
was overlooked as a mere Vorticist jeu d'esprit, while in 1932 the 
more accessible revised version appeared in the midst of three 
other controversial Lewis books, 2 and long after the Vorticist 
inspiration of the play could make a claim on public attention. 
N o r has Enemy of the Stars fared better among the relatively small 
circle of Lewis devotees and critics. 3 But, in a recent study by 
Reed Way Dasenbrock, The Literary Vorticism of Ezra Pound and 
Wyndham Lewis, Enemy of the Stars is accorded a central place as a 
crucial Vorticist, and therefore, he argues, an important modern-
ist, literary document: "If the Vorticist movement is not exactly 
the vortex of modernism, it is its seedbed or laboratory" ( 150) , 
Dasenbrock claims. "Enemy of the Stars, with its paratactic concat-
enation of phrases anticipated the subsequent stylistic direction 
of Pound, El iot , and Joyce," and announced "a central theme in 
modernism" ( 135) . 
I wil l not argue here, since I have addressed it elsewhere 
(Foshay), the larger question as to whether Vorticism, and 
Lewis's work in particular, are better understood as modernist or 
avant-garde. Preliminary to such questions is a reading of Lewis's 
early work that does justice to its challenge and complexity. I wil l 
demonstrate that Enemy of the Stars, far from a mere stylistic or 
"gestural" tour de force (Dasenbrock 135) , is a work of formidable 
thematic substance, and further that the thematic content of the 
play is a shaping force behind the experimental form of the text. 
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Enemy of the Stars is an unjustly neglected work central to an 
understanding both of Lewis's development and of the brief but 
intriguing pyrotechnics of Vorticism. But the focus here is on 
Enemy of the Stars and its place in Lewis's career, rather than on 
Vorticism as a movement. I wil l discuss two central passages in the 
play and go on to a reading of Lewis's essay "Physics of the Not-
Self," which accompanied the 1932 text and which describes 
itself as "in the nature of metaphysical commentary upon the 
ideas suggested by the action of Enemy of the Stars" (195) . The 
relation between the play and its "metaphysical commentary" is 
problematical, and, because of it, all the more i l luminating about 
Enemy of the Stars and Lewis's development as a writer. 
I 
As a consciously Vorticist work, Enemy of the Stars revolves, literally, 
figuratively, and conceptually, around the central character, Ar-
ghol. The image of the vortex is meant to convey the tension 
between dynamism and stasis, between rapid circular motion 
and its fixed centre. As Lewis defines h im in Blast, the "vorticist is 
at his maximum point of energy when stillest." The image in-
cludes not only energy in space but also in time: "The new vortex 
plunges to the heart of the present" ( 1 4 7 , 1 4 8 ) . Argho l is the still 
point and focus of all action and attention in Enemy. The play is 
said by the narrator to be his "agon," and he a "Foredoomed 
Prometheus," a propitiatory sacrifice to the forces both human 
(historical, temporal) and cosmic (eternal, spatial) that are 
ranged against h im. The narrator describes the beginning of the 
action: 
THE RED WALLS OF T H E UNIVERSE NOW SHUT [POSTERITY] 
IN, WITH THIS FOREDOOMED PROMETHEUS. THEYBREATHE 
IN CLOSE ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR AND NECESSITY, UNTIL 
THE EXECUTION IS OVER AND T H E RED WALLS RECEDE— 
THE DESTINY OF A R G H O L CONSUMMATED, T H E UNIVERSE 
SATISFIED! (145) 
Before this, after introducing the characters and setting, the 
narrator turns to his audience, anticipating objections: 
[ 'Yet you and me!' I hear you—What of you and mei 'Why not from the 
english metropolis?' But in this mad marriage of false minds, is not this a 
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sort of honeymoon ? We go abroad. Such a strange thing as our coming to-
gether requires a strange place too for the initial stages of our intimate 
ceremonious acquaintance. It is our 'agon' too. Remember that it is our 
destiny!] (143) 
In this narratorial aside, Lewis conveys that Argho l is a type of 
modern humanity, that his struggle and inevitable propitiatory 
sacrifice typify our own, that his agon is our agon too. As an 
experimental attempt at Vorticist literature, Enemy of the Stars 
reconstructs spatial and temporal coordinates to evoke in the 
audience awareness of a crisis, of a dramatic physical and spiri-
tual challenge or agon at the heart of modernity. 
In fact, Enemy of the Stars is not a play at all , but a k ind of novel 
(Flory 9 3 ) , a narrative about a play set in a surreal universe, in a 
time dimension called the "Thirtieth Centuries," in which the 
audience comprises the whole of humanity. Called simply "Pos-
terity," it includes representatives of all generations. The vision-
ary nature of the setting extends to scenes, properties, and 
costumes, which change and shift of their own accord. There is a 
necessarily heavy dependence on the narrator, who describes 
and extensively interprets characters, action, and fantastic 
setting. 
There is a series of parallels in the work with classical tragedy: 
the action is an agon; Argho l is a Prometheus figure; the charac-
ters, as in classical drama, wear masks designed to amplify their 
voices: " T H E M A S K S F I T T E D W I T H T R U M P E T S O F A N T I Q U E 
T H E A T R E — W I T H E F F E C T O F C H I L D R E N B L O W I N G A T 
E A C H O T H E R W I T H T O Y I N S T R U M E N T S O F M E T A L " ( 144) . 
At a significant point early in the principal section of the narra-
tive, the action stops and the focus of attention becomes the 
masked face of Arghol : 
[ The aloof master of this arc-lit vortex is Arghol. His mask has been designed to 
represent the magical function. . . . But abruptly everything flicks out. . . .In 
the momentary blank a close-up of the chief player's head is conveyed, in a 
breathless upward rush, to the distant watchers... then the fact stands out for 
all to see—a pallid mask. . . . All gaze upon it as upon a spectacle of 
awe.} (160-61) 
Arghol 's mask is foregrounded as the still point of the "arc-lit 
vortex"; "snatched up to be scrutinized by the busybodies in the 
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remotest galleries of Time" (161), it is the locus where the dy-
namics of space and time meet. 
Etymologically, our word "person" is derived from the Lat in 
persona, "a mask, especially as worn by actors in Greek and 
Roman drama," and, by extension, the "role, part, character, 
person represented by an actor" (Simpson). The problem of 
personality, of self and of identity, is the central theme of the long 
dialogue between Argho l and his companion, Hanp, who repre-
sents the sensuous body and who identifies with the collective 
mind of modern humanity. Argho l at one point declares: 
W h e n m a n k i n d are unable to overcome a personality, they have an 
i m m e m o r i a l way out of the difficulty. They become it. They imitate 
and assimilate that Ego unt i l it is no longer o n e — t h a t is what is called 
success. As between Personality and the G r o u p , it is forever a question 
of dog and cat. These two are diametrically opposed species. Self is 
the ancient race, the rest are the new one. Self is the race that 
lost. (155) 
The formal centrality of Arghol 's mask, then, points to and 
reinforces the thematic priority of the play, the problem of 
human identity, represented by Argho l and Hanp. Argho l is the 
Self, "the ancient race," "the race that lost" to the likes of Hanp, 
whose "bourgeois aspirations undermine that virtuosity of self." 
Hanp is "a violent underdog . . . put at the service of Unknown 
Humanity, our King . " The "new race" of mankind is the headless 
mob, "Unknown Humanity, our King , " whose "boundless royal 
aversion for the great Protagonist . . . finds expression in the 
words and expressions of this humble locum tenens [Hanp]" 
(143)-
The allusions suggest that Arghol , as the "foredoomed Prom-
etheus," has stolen his figurative fire, not from the gods for 
humanity, but from humanity, in an attempt to assert a godlike 
sovereign identity, a Self. The classical allusions in Enemy func-
tion as pointers to the inversion of values that has taken place in 
the modern displacement of the classical world view. Within 
modernity, the battle is not the attempt of humanity to capture 
an heroic, godlike identity from the transcendental realm. It is, 
rather, the need to deny the very existence of a world beyond 
nature and any necessity to assert an heroic identity independent 
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of the material conditions of life. Argho l is an inverse Prom-
etheus; his "persona" is not heroic; instead, the masks give the 
ludicrous effect of "two children blowing at each other with toy 
instruments of metal." We are told that the set for the main scene 
is " S U G G E S T E D B Y C H A R A C T E R S T A K I N G U P T H E I R POSI-
T I O N A T T H E O P E N I N G O F T H E S H A F T L E A D I N G D O W N 
I N T O M I M E ' S Q U A R T E R S . " Argho l and Hanp , " G I D D I L Y 
M O U N T I N G I N [the] O P E N I N G " formed from the mime's 
stage entrance, as if from " T H E U N D E R G R O U N D " ( 144) , are 
mimicked or parodied by the setting, which associates them not 
with the Olympian but with the subterranean, chthonic spirits of 
the underworld. They become parodies of the heroes of Attic 
tragedy, and, as two employees of a provincial wheelwright, are 
the farthest thing from Aristotle's aristocratic tragic heroes (Po-
etics 1453a, 10). 
Enemy of the Stars, in addition to its syntactic experimentation, is 
conceived on the formal level as a Vorticist universe operating 
under its own laws of space and time. But, more fundamentally, 
the formal Vorticist design of the play is explicitly enlisted as 
support and emphasis in the unfolding of a fully developed, 
indeed, a determining, thematic content. As already mentioned, 
Enemy is an unperformable play; it is the story of a surrealistic 
drama that takes place within a fantastic spatio-temporal realm. 
The formal, Vorticist structure of this universe finds its physical 
axis in Arghol , literally in his face, that is, his mask or persona. 
(Hanp later partially decapitates Arghol , a further physical cor-
relative of the mind /body conflict taking place between himself 
and Argho l and within Arghol himself.) Just as the formal (spa-
tial) structure of the play incarnates the theme of Arghol 's sacri-
fice, so the temporal, narrative structure of the work is more than 
simply a medium, possessing an added reflexive dimension. 
As a narrative of a play, it has itself a thematic content. The lack 
of an objective, ontological polarity between human beings and a 
transcendental realm against which they struggle to define them-
selves robs the theme of the essential ingredients of drama, at 
least in the classical terms against which Lewis is defining Vorti-
cist humanity. The agon of modernity is not an objective contest, 
humans measuring themselves against the ideal of the gods in a 
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struggle full of the pathos, the pity and fear, of tragic human 
limitations. It is, rather, an internecine warfare of humans with 
themselves represented in the confrontation between Argho l 
and Hanp, between individualism and collectivism. Hanp is the 
man of the people, of purely material and pragmatic concerns, 
who mocks Arghol 's preoccupation with Self, with a higher iden-
tity and purpose which leads to his excepting himself from 
commonsense expectations. Hanp is the man of the body, Ar-
ghol the man of the mind . The "plot" of Enemy is Arghol 's 
gradual discovery that his conflict with Hanp is really a conflict 
internal to himself, between his own m i n d and body. It is Lewis's 
attempt to point to the source of the modern agon as a divided-
ness of humans from themselves, within themselves, which re-
duces them to the bathos of a pure self-involvement, a state of 
confusion incapable of action either positive or negative. As 
Arghol says: "To make it worthwhile to destroy myself there is not 
enough there to do it with and that's a fact!" ( 1 6 9 ) . 4 
By rendering Enemy as the narrative of an unperformable play, 
Lewis is pointing his readers in on themselves in the privacy of 
their reading: "It is our 'agon ' too. Remember that it is our destiny.r By 
breaking up the syntactic continuity and flow of his sentences, 
Lewis tries to bring about a formal vision of a static world, which 
will presumably serve the recognition by his readers of the Vorti-
cist condition of modern life. We have also seen how the Vorticist 
formal design of Enemy, in focussing on Arghol 's mask, tries to fix 
the reader's attention on the graphic representation of the the-
matic axis of the work (the "stage directions" stop the action with 
a close-up on the mask). A l o n g with its status as a narrative of a 
play, we can see that all the formal elements of Enemy of the Stars 
are consciously designed to contribute to the thematic content 
of the work, and are motivated and informed by Lewis's vision of 
the modern agon. A second passage of the work reveals what 
Lewis sees as the source of the problem. 
II 
The long dialogue that forms the centrepiece of Enemy of the 
Stars results in Arghol 's realization that the basis of his con-
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flictual relationship with Hanp is a projection of himself onto 
Hanp: 
That's it! I find I wished to make of you . . . The animal to me! . . . I 
wished—I've just found out—to make you myself you see. But every 
man who wishes that—to make out of another an inferior Self—is 
lost. He's after a mate for his detached ailment—we say self, but 
mean something else. For without others—the Not-Self—there 
would be no self. (175-76) 
Arghol , having realized he was merely using Hanp as an antidote 
to his own inner contradictions, attempts to banish Hanp . Hanp 
will not be dismissed so peremptorily; a fight ensues and after-
wards both collapse into unconsciousness. The narrative follows 
Arghol as "he rolls heavily into sleep. Now a dark dream begins 
valuing, with its tentative symbols, the foregoing events" ( 1 8 0 ) . 
Argho l dreams that he has returned to Ber l in , and to the room 
he had occupied there as a student before he abandoned the city. 
H e picks up an open book, Max Stirner's Der Einzige und Sein 
Eigentum: 
Stirner. Well! That bad offshoot of the master of Marx in his prime. 
That constipated philosopher of action. 
One of the seven arrows of his martyr mind! 
Poof! he flings it out of the window. (181) 
Moments later, someone arrives at the door, having retrieved the 
book from where it had fallen amidst a funeral procession. The 
figure at the door is first seen as "an undergraduate, " but then, in 
dream-like fashion, is transformed, first into Hanp, then into 
Stirner himself, and finally into "a middle-aged man . . . evidently 
a philosopher. Self-possessed, loose, f ree . . . . Stirner, in fact, as he 
had first imagined h im" ( 182) . 
At the beginning of Enemy of the Stars, Arghol is presented as 
being "in immense collapse of chronic philosophy" ( 143) . The 
action of the narrative has reached a climax in Arghol 's recogni-
tion of his exploitation of Hanp and Hanp's retaliation at being 
rejected. The post-pugilistic dream, "valuing, with its tentative 
symbols, the foregoing events," is Arghol 's unconscious, instinc-
tual narration of the events leading up to the traumatic fight with 
Hanp, a fight that will shortly lead to Hanp's cutting Arghol 's 
throat while the latter snores in exhaustion. That is to say, the 
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reader, so far given Arghol 's intellectual commentary on what 
the narrator describes as his "immense collapse of chronic phi-
losophy," is now presented with the commentary of Arghol 's 
unconscious perceptions of his experience. However "tentative" 
and "symbolic" the dream version is, it is also more direct, more 
concrete. It is the commentary by his "Hanpness," "the A n i m a l " 
in Argho l , of the physical and finite side of his experience, with 
which he has been unable to come to terms. 
The dream reveals that Arghol 's philosophical collapse is typ-
ified in his reading of Stirner's book. The book left open (i.e., 
being actively read), Arghol 's attempt to r id himself of Stirner is 
foiled by a figure which is transformed from Hanp , into Stirner 
himself, into the mature, "free," and "self-possessed" ideal philos-
opher of Arghol 's imagination, a figure he had once identified 
with Stirner ( "Stirner, in fact, as he had first imagined him") . First 
translated into English in 1907 as TheEgo and his Own,5 Stirner's 
single major work presents his Neo-Hegelian supreme egoism. In 
opposition both to Christianity and to Hegel's transcendental 
Absolute M i n d , into which all mere individuality must eventually 
pass, Stirnerian egoism champions the absolute, uncategorizable 
uniqueness of the individual self: 
G o d and m a n k i n d have concerned themselves for nothing, for noth-
ing but themselves. Let me likewise concern myself for myself, who am 
equally with G o d the nothing of al l others, who am my al l , who am the 
unique one. (41) 
The universality of spiritual and philosophical absolutes, in Stir-
ner's view, eclipses the particularity of individual existence. Iden-
tity lacks all specificity from a Christian or Hegelian point of view, 
and is therefore a "nothing," empty of any explicable signifi-
cance. Stirner turns the tables on the tradition, drawing out the 
logical corollary that, from his own point of view, all else but his 
specificity and uniqueness is a nothing/ 1 
The Stirnerian ego is sui generis: 
T o be a man is not to realize the ideal o f Man, but to present oneself, 
the individual . It is not how I realize the generally human that needs to 
be my task, but how I satisfy myself. I am my species, am without 
n o r m , without law, without model , and the like. (55) 
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It is hardly surprising that Stirner d id not write another book of 
comparable force or originality. Where can thought go from the 
principle of its own uncategorizable uniqueness? Equally explica-
ble is Arghol 's philosophical collapse following on his appren-
ticeship to Stirner. More to the point, however, is the dream's 
revelation of Arghol 's virtual identification with Stirner as philos-
opher and of the philosopher as such with Stirner. That is to say, 
Arghol 's dream reveals that the philosophical collapse into solip-
sism that had been unfolded in the dialogue with Hanp is inter-
nally inconsistent. Stimer's doctrine of individual uniqueness is 
sdii a doctrine; it is the universalized model of specificity. As a 
disciple of Stirner, Argho l not only had embraced solipsism, but 
in the very act of doing so had undermined the apparent logic of 
egoistic self-sufficiency in becoming the follower of a doctrine 
which itself rejects the notion of any ego patterning itself after 
another. Where can Argho l go when he is barred even from 
entering a cul-de-saâ 
The attempt to explain such a condit ion to his erstwhile disci-
ple issues in Arghol 's "enlightenment," his realization that all 
action, from his passivistic return to his rural home and submis-
sion to the physical abuse of his employer-uncle, even to his mere 
attempt to explain himself to Hanp, is pre-empted by this nihilis-
tic quandary: "[W]e say self but mean something else. For with-
out others—the Not-Self—there would be no self." The very 
ground of supposed uniqueness and authenticity is an illusion, 
and the "sel f is merely the locus of an aporia, a contradiction in 
terms. It is a self that, in its dependence upon others as "Not-
Self," is equally a self and a not-self; or rather neither in any 
absolute sense. 
Arghol 's unconscious "valuation" of his fight with Hanp, with 
its "tentative symbols," is capable of a precision that Arghol 's 
discursive explanation to H a n p of his post-philosophical condi-
tion is not. Just as the Vorticist formal structure of the narrative 
finds its symbolic axis in the foregrounding of Arghol 's mask, so 
the thematic content achieves symbolic form in his dreamt re-
turn to his Stirner apprenticeship. The figure that returns The 
Ego and his Own in the dream appears first as Hanp, then as 
Stirner, then as Arghol 's own ideal philosopher. Arghol 's actual 
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experience had been in reverse order, from a philosophical 
ideal, to Stirner, to Hanp. That his discipleship to Stirner should 
lead h im to annex to himself in turn such a quotidian disciple as 
Hanp is one of the problems around which Enemy of the Stars 
revolves (so to speak). The narrative motivation is provided by 
Hanp's need to push Argho l for an explanation of his behaviour 
(which will in turn provide Hanp with an understanding of his 
own role), an explanation that, in the very effort to provide it, 
disabuses Argho l of his need for Hanp's companionship. Be-
cause of the internal inconsistency of Stirnerian solipsism (the 
principle of egoistic uniqueness), Arghol 's immense philosophi-
cal collapse has put h im beyond the capacity to provide a ra-
tionale for either his condition or its consequences. Argho l has 
become an embodiment of self-contradiction, something in itself 
offensive to the pragmatic consciousness of Hanp, driving h im to 
r id nature of the Arghol ian anomaly. Hanp murders the sleeping 
Arghol , and so " T H E D E S T I N Y O F A R G H O L [is] C O N S U M -
M A T E D , T H E U N I V E R S E SATISFIED!" 
After the "something distant, terrible, and eccentric" that Ar-
ghol embodies has been "forever banished from Matter" ( 190) , 
"a galloping blackness of mood overtakes the lonely figure" of 
Hanp, and he quickly jumps in the canal: "He sinks like a 
plummet . . . heavy with hatred and nothing left to work it off 
on—so quite certain to go to the bottom and stop there" (191). 
Having expelled the representative of Personality, of self, there is 
nothing against which Hanp can define himself as not-self. He 
merges himself with undifferentiated Matter, then there is 
nothing: 
A black cloud enters and occupies the whole arena, immediately 
everything is blotted out... . Then there is no sound in particular and 
only the blackness of a moonless and unstarlit night. (191) 
Stirner is the thematic axis of Enemy of the Stars in the way that 
Arghol 's mask is its formal axis. 7 As philosophical model, Stirner 
embodies the discrepancy that on the formal level is revealed 
between persona, with its origin in dramatic character (i.e., imag-
inative construct), and (via Christianity) its modern, romantic 
transmogrification into identity, self-present completeness, that 
is to say, into Stirnerian uniqueness. Enemy of the Stars, then, is 
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perfectly coherent on both formal and thematic levels as a repre-
sentation of the crisis of solipsism that Lewis presents as charac-
terizing modernity. Enemy of the Stars can be seen primarily as a 
radical philosophical vision, which in its urgency and extremity 
required a sufficiently striking and revolutionary form and style. 
I l l 
I have argued that the narrative motivation of Enemy of the Stars is 
controlled by a preoccupation with the very preconditions of 
coherent identity and experience, and therefore of dramatic 
representation of its action, and that an appreciation of these 
priorities in the construction of the text is crucial to a sympa-
thetic reading. But a crack in Lewis's own disposition in relation 
to Enemy of the Stars emerges in the hiatus between the 1914 and 
1932 texts. 
The 1914 and 1932 texts are punctuated by an essay, "Physics of 
the Not-Self," first published separately in 1925," but included 
(slightly revised) in the 1932 edition of the play. Like Enemy of the 
Stars itself, the essay has never been accorded more than the most 
cursory analysis, and this despite the striking declaration of its 
opening lines: 
This essay is i n the nature of a metaphysical commentary u p o n the 
ideas suggested by the action of Enemy of the Stars. Briefly, it is in-
tended to show the h u m a n m i n d i n its traditional role of the enemy of 
life, as an oddity outside the machine. (195) 
But "Physics" is as difficult to follow on first reading as is Enemy of 
the Stars itself, conducting a very oblique argument on mind as 
"enemy of life" and never commenting on how it is to be seen as 
functioning in the play itself. Despite the explicit announcement 
of his intention, Lewis is i l l- inclined to make the commentary 
easy for his readers. 
"Ethics of the Not -Se l f might be a more appropriate tide, 
since the essay focusses on the question of "goodness" in the light 
of the problematic of the self at work in Enemy of the Stars. The 
argument has two phases. First, Lewis looks at the problem of 
"truth" inherent in the self/not-self opposition and the ethical 
notions implicated in it. Second, he turns to what he calls "the 
old status of 'goodness'" ( 1 9 9 ) , to what he claims is a more 
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objective tradition of morality, which he identifies with the 
Greeks and particularly with Socrates. The essay is a polemical 
manipulation of the dialectic of truth and goodness as impli -
cated in that of self and not-self. The truth of self (called by Lewis 
"catonic," presumably after the pragmatism of Cato the 
Younger) is the truth which immediately serves the practical 
ends of the man of action, the "man of his word," who knows 
what he, and life, are about. In contrast is the truth of the 
philosopher, who is chronically uncertain about what is genu-
inely true: "His scruples brand h im as a liar from the start," his 
affirmations "so beset with reservations that [they remain] a 
particularly offensive sort of lie for those who prefer the will's 
truth to that of the intellect" ( 196) . 
The truth of the self, of the man of action, the "will's truth," is 
what serves his interests. The truth of the intellect is, in contrast, 
so uncertain as to disabuse its devotees of all easy certainty, even 
of the knowledge of who they themselves are: "The not-self estab-
lished in the centre of the intellect betrays at every moment its 
transient human associate" ( 1 9 6 ) . Because it brings with it this 
uncertainty, this dedication to the objective, and counting of 
oneself as naught, philosophic truth is greeted by pragmatists as 
an anti-social principle. The philosopher is the "enemy," "in 
league with the diabolical principle of the not-self ( 198) . Such a 
"giver" cannot be trusted: " A gift that expects no return is not a 
human gift. . . . If you are respectable, then you can only accept 
things from a person who evidently benefits more than you do as 
a consequence of his bounty" ( 1 9 9 ) . The irony is palpable, Lewis 
appearing to feel justified in his counter-polemic by the inherent 
bias of conventional utilitarianism. 
In the second part of the essay, Lewis turns from polemics to 
rational argument, presenting a serious ethics of the not-self 
rooted in the Greek notion of "goodness." Relying on the histo-
rian of philosophy J o h n Burnet, Lewis argues that the term used 
by Socrates to designate the highest philosophical and artistic 
attainments was arete, of which "'goodness' in its modern sense is, 
as a translation, misleading." After Burnet, he maintains that 
goodness as arete "had no ethical significance . . . 'it was, in fact, 
what we call efficiency.'" Lewis cites L idde l l and Scott on arete: 
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'"goodness, excellence of any kind; excellence in any art' " ( 2 0 0 ) . 
His argument, then, is for the non-ethical significance of the 
Greek notion of "goodness," and he goes on to bolster this by 
identifying the Greek and H i n d u notions of goodness as knowl-
edge of the eternal {episteme as opposed to doxa, belief): 'This 
epistemological absolute is much the same as Brahman; and the 
inferior knowledge of the world of temporal experience is much 
the same as the upanishadic avidya [ignorance, delusion] " ( 201 ). 
Lewis pushes this line of argument further, invoking Socrates 
in support of a strict mind /body dualism (to the extent of 
assimilating the monism of Socrates to the dualism of the Mani-
chees). H e again invokes Burnet, emphasizing Socrates's Pythag-
orean sympathies, attributing his originality to "the introduction 
of ethical and aesthetic forms upon a footing of equality with the 
mathematical" ( 2 0 2 ) . Lewis concludes that the highest philo-
sophical and artistic excellence is therefore a Stoic apatheia, a 
rising above all interest, whether in emotional involvement or 
power: "Love, too, is in this category. . . . You cannot, logically, 
'love' or admire, either, i f you fully understand" ( 2 0 3 ) . This 
supreme detachment makes of Lewis's philosopher/artist "an 
indifferent god" ( 2 0 2 ) . 
Lewis concludes by quoting Alcibiades on Socrates in the 
Symposium, to the effect that Socrates's apparent desire for 
intimacy with beautiful young men is an affectation. H e '"de-
spises more than anyone can imagine all external possessions, 
whether it be beauty or wealth, or g l o r y . . . and lives among men, 
making all objects of their admiration the playthings of his 
irony'" ( 2 0 4 ) . Lewis ends the essay abruptly on this considera-
tion of Socratic irony, that the detachment called for by a single-
minded pursuit of excellence issues in an ironic stance towards 
the world and towards all who take it seriously. The unavoidable 
implication, of course, is that Lewis identifies himself, respecting 
Enemy of the Stars, as such a Socratic ironist. 9 
The sum of Lewis's argument in "Physics" is that with Socrates 
"ethics is only introduced to be disposed of; for the skill-cum-
knowledge-goodness of Socrates . . . are very mathematical concep-
tions, when compared with those of more emotional ethics" 
( 2 0 2 ) . As a "metaphysical commentary" on Enemy of the Stars, 
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"Physics" champions a non-ethical objectivism, a purely intellec-
tual virtue. Indeed, the polemical thrust of the essay leads Lewis 
to stigmatize emotion itself and to advocate an impersonalist not-
self that is indistinguishable from depersonalization. This ambi-
guity in his position is clearly reflected in the inconsistency of his 
treatment of "love" in the essay. In the polemical phase of the 
argument, when he is ironically contrasting the pragmatist and 
the philosopher, Lewis says of the objective stance of the intel-
lect: "Since, again, by its very nature it awakens love, that is not in 
its favour either. Love being the thing that is most prized by men, 
the individual who (in league with the diabolical principle of the 
not-self) appears to be attempting to obtain it by unlawful means 
is at once without the pale" ( 198) . Yet, as we have already seen, in 
the Socratic definition of not-self as pure, disinterested knowing, 
"no emotional idea of 'power,' even, must be attached to the 
highest knowledge. . . . Love, too, is in this category" ( 2 0 3 ) . 
Though an argument can be made for a meaningful difference 
between passive "awakening" of love and active "attachment" to it 
as a form of desire, in practice Lewis fails to make such a distinc-
tion good. 
In his exploitation of the passage on Socratic irony, in which 
Alcibiades emphasizes Socrates's rejection of "all external posses-
sions" (emphasis added), Lewis makes of it a critical treatment of 
persons: 
What [Alcibiades] says, in short, is that Socrates is p u l l i n g the leg of 
the Greek exoletus, whom he caressed. . . . [W] as not the language of 
love the cynical g i ld ing of the pill? We cannot be surprised that this 
peculiar and very rare sense of fun should have brought h i m at last to 
a violent e n d — o r , at least, an abrupt and involuntary one. (204) 
Lewis cannot have his cake and eat it. The not-self cannot "by its 
very nature awaken love," and, as in the case of Socrates, br ing 
upon one the violent hostility of the community. Being "without 
the pale," as he says in the first instance, is not the same as being 
an "enemy principle," perceived as an active threat to the status 
quo. As already mentioned, Lewis assimilates Socratic monism to 
Manichean dualism, that is, a higher unification of virtue and 
knowledge as arete is seen by h im as equivalent to the antagonism 
of the Dark and Light in the teaching of M a n i ( 2 0 2 ) . We can 
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trace Lewis's ambivalence on the question of emotion, love, and 
personality, then, to a philosophical confusion, or, at the least, a 
lack of clarity at the core of his "metaphysical commentary" on 
Enemy. 
"Physics of the Not-Self' demonstrates that Lewis is unclear, 
when engaged in philosophical discourse, about the idealist and 
transcendental implications of his position. The very existence of 
"Physics" as a "metaphysical commentary" is a manifestation of 
Lewis's ambivalence. As our discussion of Enemy of the Stars has 
shown, Lewis demonstrates a very clear grasp, in the context of 
his art practice, of the self-contradictory status of philosophical 
discourse in post-Hegelian, anti-transcendentalist philosophy, as 
represented in the play by Stirner. H e clearly sees in Enemy that 
the rejection of transcendentalist solutions in post-romantic phi-
losophy creates the " C L O S E A T M O S P H E R E O F T E R R O R A N D 
N E C E S S I T Y ' (145) characteristic of modernity. Yet, no doubt in 
response to the blank perplexity elicited by the play, Lewis aban-
dons this clarity and invokes classical precedent in explanation of 
his work. Lewis can perhaps be accused of a merely strategic 
criticism, an attempt to exploit the ambiguities in critical dis-
course that he explores with conscience and conviction in his art: 
"Similarly, was not the language of [metaphysical commentary] 
the cynical gi lding of the pil l?" ("Physics" 2 0 4 ) . 
I V 
"Physics of the Not-Self' demonstrates that Lewis was fully aware 
of the ethical implications of his chief Vorticist work. "Physics" 
argues, as we have seen, for an "ethics of the not-self," but his 
valuation of the "still point" of the not-self is arete, the "skill-cum-
knowledge-goodness of Socrates." Lewis calls, in fact, for a 
Nietzschean "transvaluation of values," an attempt to go "beyond 
good and evil," to the stability of an "epistemological absolute." 
In its specific contradiction of the deeper insights of the artwork 
on which it is a commentary, "Physics" is a commentary indeed on 
the crisis of discourse and representation which Enemy of the Stars 
addresses, a crisis in which Lewis himself is deeply implicated and 
in relation to which he is far from achieving his own ethic of arete, 
of an intellectual and logical apatheia, that would make of h i m as 
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an artist the "indifferent god" in dispassionate contemplation of 
the world. 
The invocation of Nietzsche here is not without purpose. H e is 
the silent antagonist and foundational intellectual influence on 
Lewis's early career. 1 0 The argument for a non-ethical, intellec-
tual ideal in "Physics," in its appeal to Socrates as model , is an 
attempt to turn Nietzsche's call for a "revaluation of values" 
against h im. Socrates was himself the antagonist of much of 
Nietzsche's thought, but particularly so in The Birth of Tragedy, 
where he is cast as the vil lain, "the type of the theoretical man" 
( 1 0 2 8 ) , and source of "the profound illusion" of a victory of 
reason over intuition: "This i l lusion consists in the imperturb-
able belief that, with the clue of logic, thinking can reach to the 
nethermost depths of being" ( 1 0 2 9 ) . h ' s this Apol lon ian belief 
in logic that Nietzsche sees as undermining the "tragic percep-
t ion" which achieved its highest realization in the Dionysian art 
of Aeschylus. In choosing Socrates as model in "Physics," Lewis 
champions an Apol lonian , logical transvaluation of values, in 
contrast to Nietzsche's Dionysian apotheosis of the self as wil l to 
power. 1 1 The preoccupation with classical dramatic motifs in 
Enemy itself now appears less arbitrary and recondite. Enemy of the 
Stars is Lewis's Apol lon ian answer to Nietzsche's call for a re-
newed Dionysian tragic art. 1 2 In fixing on Stirner, Lewis goes 
directly to the precondition for Nietzsche's own analysis of the 
crisis of n ih i l i sm, 1 3 in an attempt clearly to extrapolate and 
represent its ramifications for a genuinely modern art. Lewis's 
contention i n Enemy that "drama," particularly tragic drama, is 
inappropriate to modernity is perhaps an attempt to push nihi l -
ism to even more radical conclusions than Nietzsche. The con-
clusion of Enemy of the Stars is that discourse is in itself a 
compromise with temporality and with pragmatic nescience 
(Hanpness). Language can no longer be the vehicle of a logical 
"thought content," a pure signified, but must be a performative 
act, a symbolic gesture, a verbal dance in which signification is a 
function of the total work of art, rather than of any "truth" which 
it may be said to contain. 
A thematic, formal, and stylistic unity and seriousness in Enemy 
of the Stars derive from its attempt to represent bathos. Lewis's 
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ambivalence is the ambivalence of modernity, so vividly an-
nounced by Nietzsche, a questioning of the very grounds and 
possibility of both truth and goodness in a post-classical world. 
Lewis was caught on the horns of ambivalence, in a dualistic 
response to Nietzsche's invocation of Dionysian tragedy and will 
to power that took the form of the Apol lon ian Enemy of the Stars 
and its "metaphysical commentary," "Physics of the Not-Self." We 
can be critical of Lewis for not sustaining the virtue which he 
himself enunciated in "Physics," the excellence of intellect, 
which he is himself offending in attempting a "metaphysical 
commentary" that is demonstrated in Enemy of the Stars itself as no 
longer appropriate to modernity. 
Lewis effectively embodies, i f he does not successfully resolve, 
the ambivalence of the modern era, challenged as it is in particu-
lar by Hegel's declaration of the end of the essential usefulness of 
art: our thought has changed the world and therefore the condi-
tions of our art; it is somehow only within art that we can grasp 
the full conditions of our thought. Lewis addresses the first 
problem in Enemy of the Stars, and then falls victim to the second 
in "Physics of the Not-Self." The fuller implications of Lewis's 
development as artist and critic centre on his relation to 
Nietzsche, his attempt to answer and to circumvent h im, a rela-
tion which sets h im within the wider context of European mod-
ernism, and which through h im can br ing to our appreciation of 
English modernism an added understanding of its place in the 
larger modernist movement. 1 4 
N O T E S 
1 It was preceded by a handful of short stories published in the English Review and 
later revised and collected in The Wild Body, an unpublished, intentionally 
"potboiling" novel, appearing posthumously as Aira. Dukes' Million, and some 
juvenile poetry (see Rude Assignment 123-24) . 
2 Filibusters in Barbary, The Doom of Youth, and Snooty Baronet The present discussion 
will depend on the 1932 text, since, as Wendy Flory observes in "Enemy of the Stars" 
(in Meyers), its "changes do not correct the earlier version so much as amplify it, 
making clear that after eighteen years his concern was not to modify or qualify 
what he originally wrote, but to present the same characters and the same basic 
ideas as forcefully, dramatically and accessibly as possible" ( 9 2 ) . Further refer-
ences will be to the reprint in Munton and are given parenthetically in the text. 
» Kenner, Wagner, Chapman, and Materer ( 1 9 7 6 and 1979) give it short shrift, 
while Jameson fails to mention it. Kush is concerned largely with the visual/ 
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literary relations. Flory makes the best contribution to our understanding of the 
play. 
i Martin Esslin remarks, in "Modernity and Drama" (in Chefdor et al.), on the crisis 
in modern drama in the light of attempts different from Lewis's to overcome 
alienation: "Have we not reached the limits, the point at which even the defini-
tion of what drama, what theater, is has been almost totally dissolved by the 
tearing down of the distinction between actor and spectator, audience and 
participant-in-the-action?" ( 6 4 ) . 
5 Max Stirner, The Ego and his Oiun, trans. S. T. Byington (New York, 1907; London, 
1912). This translation forms the basis of John Carroll's edition, used here. 
'"> Karl Lowith observes: "Stirner's book . . . has usually been considered the 
anarchic product of an eccentric, but it is in reality the logical consequence of 
Hegel's historical system, which—allegorically displaced—it reproduces ex-
actly" ( 1 0 3 ) . 
7 Arghol 's designation as "enemy of the stars" is the descriptive equivalent of his 
formal designation as a mask. It is a comment on "Max Stirner," the pseudonym 
of Johann ("aspar Schmidt. As John Carroll observes: "His unusually high fore-
head gained him the nickname of Stimerai school, and, with his individualistic 
fancy tickled and his romantic ambitions stirred by the allusion to the stars 
(.%nj=Torehead, Geslim=stäv), the plebeian name of Schmidt was abandoned" 
(18) . Arghol is "enemy" of the stars as symbols both of Stirner himself and of what 
he represents, the ego as the last refuge of transcendentalist aspirations. 
8 "The Physics of the Not-Self," The Chapbook 4 0 ( 1 9 2 5 ) : 6 8 - 7 7 . 
9 The character Sfox appears mysteriously and briefly at the end aï Enemy, with "a 
faceless helm, of a mask of inexpressive clay" (191). Sfox is Lewis as the Socrates 
whose "critics called him 'sly,' using a word (eiron), which is properly applied to 
foxes" (Burnet 132). Sfox's mask without features no doubt refers to the author-
ial indifference and impersonality which Lewis advocates in "Physics." 
10 "Nietzsche was, I believe, the paramount influence, as was the case with so many 
people prior to world war 1" (Rude Assignment 128) . For an overview of Nietzsche's 
ongoing influence in Lewis's thought, see Edwards. 
11 In a subtle aside in "Physics," Lewis identifies Nietzsche's "we truthful ones" as 
representatives of the "truth of the wi l l" ( 196) . 
i*¿ Arghol , as a Prometheus figure, is a response to Nietzsche's casting of Aeschylus's 
Prometheus in the role of Archetypal Dionysian tragic figure: "The story of 
Prometheus is an original possession of the entire Aryan race, and is documen-
tary evidence of its capacity for the profoundly tragic" ( 9 9 7 ) . 
is Though Nietzsche never mentions Stirner in his work, he is the product of the 
same intellectual milieu: "And so, historically considered, the coincidence that 
Stirner's book appeared in the year of Nietzsche's birth seems as necessary as the 
connection between Nietzsche's attempt at a new beginning and the Nothing 
which is reached in Stirner" (Lowith 176). John Carroll observes: "Overbeck's 
final conclusion . . . was that Nietzsche had read Stirner, was impressed, and 
worried that he should be confused with h im" ( 2 5 ) ; he cites the Polish Marxist 
Leszek Kolakowski's comment: '"Stirner's grounds are irrefutable . . . Even 
Nietzsche seems inconsequential in comparison to h im '" (15) . 
14 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Calgary Institute for the Human-
ities at the University of Calgary during the preparation of this paper. 
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